Steemit Update: HF21 Testnet, SPS, EIP, Rewards API, SMTs!

3개월 전

HF21 testnet.jpg

Hardfork 21

Hello Steemians, we have been hard at work adding the changes to Hardfork 21 necessary to add a long term funding mechanism to the Steem Proposal System (a/k/a SteemDAO) as well as the Economic Improvement Proposal (EIP). We are happy to announce that we have completed that work and released the code for Hardfork 21 so that public testing may commence.

Testnet

The testnet will hardfork this Thursday at 1pm EDT. At that time, witnesses and developers will be able to begin testing all of the changes included in this release. This will have no impact on regular Steem users on sites like steemit.com.

SMTs

Now that the release candidate for HF21 is out, our blockchain team has turned their attention to continuing development of the Smart Media Tokens protocol!

Rewards API

One of the additions to HF21 involves the Rewards Curve which is used to determine how much Steem a given post should receive from the Rewards Pool based on the votes it has earned and the stake (i.e. Steem Power) backing those votes. The release candidate changes the curve from a linear curve to what a convergent linear curve. @vandeberg (Senior Blockchain Engineer at Steemit) explained the convergent linear curve in this post.

In order to demonstrate the effects of the proposed changes, we created a Rewards API which enables us to simulate the rewards payout with different curves and parameters. We are also releasing this API to the public so that anyone can use it to approximate payouts on the chain at any particular time.

Gain_Loss for Convergent Linear Curve Parameterization.png

The above chart demonstrates 3 different constants fed into the convergent linear rewards curve and their effects on comment payouts. As shown in the charts, 2e12 approaches our current linear rewards at roughly 16 STEEM, which is why we feel it will provide a meaningful and balanced change to Steem’s economic distribution.

Communities

@roadscape is working on Communities. There are two aspects to Communities: 1. the backend work in Hivemind, and 2. the frontend work on steemit.com (Social Condenser). For the backend work, he has been working with community members to develop a Hivemind-based protocol specification that meets the needs of as many Steem developers as possible, not just Steemit Inc. For the frontend work, he has begun the process of combing through the user interface assets that were already developed, evaluating whether the code is still useful, and looking for those components which are reusable across approaches.

Financial Report

Our Managing Director, @elipowell, is currently preparing a financial report that will provide some transparency into our costs (primarily AWS costs) and the revenue we have been able to generate through advertising, so be sure to follow her account (@elipowell) if you’re interested in gaining deeper insight into how Steemit Inc. is operating as a company.

The Steemit Team

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This should really be called "The Proposal That Will Have No Impact On Economic Improvement"

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i undelegated my steem power, as i will curate steem posts :D
i Waited for this to come apx 2 years, i belive that steem is important because the human imput,
Nothing matters as long as boots dictate the top 10 posts, aslong as not humans are voting we are lost.

...we have been hard at work adding the changes to Hardfork 21...

There isn’t much info or a link for the final SPS and EIP proposals for this fork. Where can we see that information?

As shown in the charts, 2e12 approaches our current linear rewards at roughly 16 STEEM...

At the current STEEM price (which seems to be pegged at $0.40 - somebody stop that, please), this would bring the curve to linear at ~$6.40. I think this is ridiculously low and will neither “bring balance” nor be “meaningful.”

The main reason this EIP was pitched was to mitigate bid bots. I disagree with that reason for the changes, although I do agree that the protocol changes are good. But this “2e12” algorithm will have practically zero effect on bid bots, so I wonder why such a relatively short superlinear curve is being touted as the ideal and a “meaningful” curve.

Not to mention the fact that many human voters can also put a post into the full linear algorithm with a single vote. This seems that it will only have an effect on smaller voters/voting. That isn’t necessarily bad, but it doesn’t address what most of the promoters of the EIP are hoping to “fix.”

I would prefer a longer, more gradual trip between superlinear and linear. “Popular” and highly-rewarded content should require more voters and/or larger votes from the most invested users. I don’t think linearity at 16 STEEM accomplishes the goal of properly discovering and rewarding such content.

If you could, please link to the rest of the hard fork info. I’m sure readers would appreciate it.

[EDIT]

I see that a link for the EIP has been added to this post - a link that takes us to a post from last month from @steemitblog regarding the initial proposal. So, I'm going to assume that whatever protocols were mentioned there are what is being proposed for HF21.

Oh, right...no specifics about the protocols were mentioned. So, I'm going to assume that we are working with the following:

  1. The "2e12" curve mentioned in this post.
  2. 50/50 content rewards split.
  3. A downvote pool with an unspecified amount of voting power.
  4. An unfunded SPS.

With this info to work with, here is my stance:

  1. This is wholly insufficient and practically meaningless.
  2. I am in favor of this.
  3. I am indifferent.
  4. Seems pointless to have a proposal system with no funding, so this is a waste of code.

Overall, with the information provided, I would not approve this hard fork. I would suggest that the protocols are revised or that the complete information is publicly provided and linked in the original post.

For more info on my own positions/proposals regarding the SPS and EIP, you can read these two posts:

https://steemit.com/steem/@ats-david/thoughts-on-the-steem-proposal-system-sps

https://steemit.com/steem/@ats-david/thoughts-on-the-steem-economic-improvement-proposal-eip

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I feel similarly and will reject this hardfork. I agree about 1) and 4), but I'm more negative on 2) and 3) than you are.

I'll add that 50/50 is also insufficient; bid-bots will continue to be profitable till it's something like 20/80. What they lose out in author rewards allocation, much of it they make back in increased curation rewards. Similarly, rampant self-voters will get 100% irrespective of the splits anyway, so they don't really care. Overall, I'm indifferent, because, despite its ineffectiveness in solving the alleged issues, and disincentivizing content creation, it should hypothetically encourage people to curate and power up more.

I'm against a free-for-all downvote pool with no abuse mitigation protocols and an undefined amount of voting power. I've been campaigning for viable downvotes since the beginning, but this is a facile implementation. Even the zealots/fanboys of this hardfork will admit that this will bring around some toxicity, but it's a "necessary evil". To which I'll say - if you really think encouraging toxicity has any place in a "social" network, at any point, you know your entire system is due for an absolute and complete overhaul. I'm tempted to invoke Godwin's law, but I'll pass. To be clear, I do think things will settle down, and it may marginally benefit the economy. Like you, my opinion has little consequence to the consensus, but I don't want any part of this anti-social network as a witness.

The only solution is a complete overhaul from scratch. When they get around to it, and is designed by people who understand elementary human behaviour, I'll consider returning.

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The only solution is a complete overhaul from scratch. When they get around to it, and is designed by people who understand elementary human behaviour, I'll consider returning.

Agreed. Maybe a small group of people should put in a proposal to SPS to fund an economic team. Tweaking the same parameters every HF is just not going to do what is promised - we need to look deeper.

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But why get rid of the bidbots when it's better for business to cater to plagiarists and folks willing to extract tokens with as little effort as possible so they can dump them as soon as they are received? Why would it make sense to encourage actual content producers to do well, attract millions of potential curators, and the billions of dollars they bring with them? It's counter productive to want to find ways to attract billions of dollars to this platform. A few dollars in the hands of a plagiarist and a few thousand in the hands of the few who promote them is WAY SMARTER for business than if we had millions of consumers and billions of dollars pouring in. Everyone knows that!

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Positive perception... is what is destroyed through vote selling. I've said this over and over again in posts I've written as well as comments.

Any serious high quality content creator runs a mile when they see how the system works on steem. The levels of shit content on steem aren't just the result of con artists, plagiarism and spam artists... it's also the result of a huge amount of people of quality either leaving, or never joining in the first place when they see how the system is set up.

Believe me, I pitched an idea for a steem community marketing up-and-coming authors to a friend who works in publishing in early 2018. After many conversations the jist of what she said was; that the system was far too corrupt for them to get involved and risk reputation or their clients interest.

Big mainstream entertainment industry investment is what will bring huge value to steem. And this will not happen the way things are working now.

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I have horror stories as well. I once nearly convinced a top chef in Canada to hire a blogger and do foodie articles to promote his business and menu. I had him until he saw the front page, and I had to explain why some of that trash was there. He wasn't comfortable putting his name and image next to anything like that and also said, "If I was caught buying positive reviews for my business, I would be ruined." Dude is a millionaire, drives a fast car. No doubt he would have purchased some STEEM. Articles that double as advertisments that could potentially earn enough to pay the blogger, plus have a free form of advertising, along with a platform that allows free publishing, those links can be then passed around social media. It's an easy sell until you see the disaster these folks have created with their paid votes. If someone comes and sees it's impossible to compete without paying a toll, they just take the traditional route, because it's easier and more effective. Current front page drives eyes away. Why would anyone invest in that? That approach is only for the amateurs who don't know the business, which is why the vote sellers market their service as something that leads to success. Pros already know how to be successful. They don't need the "miracle cure."

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@nonameslefttouse that is stunning. People like that are presented the blockchain alone is tough enough, but having someone that may have actually considered implementing steem/steemit into their business and feels they can't is mind-boggling to me. You are right, that is where the real growth is going to come. There needs to be some level of saturation of regular users within businesses like this. Getting new users is hard enough, steemit's focus I believe should be more on retention and let the success stories in their own carry your marketing effort for you.

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One hundred percent, every change should be focused on getting "regular people" onto steem. This whole chasing of investor dollars is silly. This myriad of problems we have would be an annoyance instead of an ecosystem if the userbase were truly in the millions and not just "millions of accounts". We need the voices of people who don't have the time or energy to waste trying to game the system. That's where the "your upvote directly rewards content creators" pitch matters. They don't care about getting 50% of their pennies back.

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The cool thing is if you feel you have a better idea there is an opportunity to create your own sidechain with steem-engine...

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I'm the user I think there should be more of. I haven't got any tech savvy, really. I think steem is a great idea as advertised, the implementation just makes it tough to be joe schmoe on here.

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I hear you m8. Yeah, that sounds very familiar.

If someone comes and sees it's impossible to compete without paying a toll, they just take the traditional route, because it's easier and more effective. Current front page drives eyes away. Why would anyone invest in that?

Absolutely spot on. There is a big issue on steem with some of the biggest SP holders having nothing to do with, and no interest in content creation, or understanding how this can be a virtuous cycle that brings increasing investment when incentives are there and are honest.

Lol, but I'm gonna retire from this comment thread I think.

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I agree. A simple directory creation for upvote purchasing may also be the answer. Allot one spot over the top twenty (non-botted payments), say the 20th one, at that, and have a random pop up feature that has any paid for/bot voted on any given search or hash tag. Then you would have to define what a bot necessarily is. My definition- a group of voting delegation for the apparent overwhelming purpose of selling votes with little to no precondition of content quality or other affiliation to that group or other subgroup in benefiting blockchain growth through original creativity or original programming. I use an example.... @steemmonsters (or the re-branded name of @splinterlands may be more appropriate). They would be the golden goose as far is this is concerned. Creating alternate tokens, building an upvote pool that was created for the purpose of benefiting their players that have done some level of content creation that is original and commentary on their game with forums now that are also tokenized. Versus bidbot X, that upvotes the person with steem/sbd ready to spend, and yes does some level of quality control but cannot be expected to patrol thousands of posts a day if they are big enough as a vote service. If more whales saw the benefits in delegating portions of their steem to causes like this, and would even actively participate or even sell the assets generated due to delegating to this venture the economy would open up... beyond belief. The upvote that carried by SM also is limited, so even the most heavily promoted post is no more than like 7-$8 at the moment, so there is certainly no guarantee that that vote purchasing will guarantee that even that post is guaranteed to land in overall trending searches. If the paid for upvoting services were collected, and listed less prominently and openly displayed as "promoted posts," again, showing up every so often rather having all posts at the top, then maybe that could also show some level of integrity of voted posts. Also with the hike in curation I am also for the bigger fish curating more because they should, they are bringing the capital to the table. The people that are whales on here are not people that went to STINC HQ and said "give me your steem," then ran out the back door and rode away in getaway cars, somehow they earned it whether we agree or disagree in how they did earn it under rules for the blockchain at the time is beside the fact, it is theirs to do with it what they wish. Long story short, opening the economy up to more users and getting actual movement in steem and SP to people that are here and doing legit work and building communities is where you are going to win. People showing up need to have a reason to stay, simply getting them here is not enough. There is a lot of support and energy that goes into that. When respectable retention becomes possible over time then we will truly see changes. I think labeling any article that has any vote within the post under a clearly defined definition of bought votes and is listed as promoted will be a great start in my humble opinion to having some credibility, among also generating some diversity in thought among those that are at the top. It seems very "group-thinkish" in how resources can be spread, or the group-think is very heavily enforced because real answers for re-invigorating the steemit economy is not being allowed into the hardforks in my humble opinion, at least since I have been here.

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All that complexity, for nothing. If I want to go on stage, I'm not going to buy the tickets for the seats in the theater. I don't even see why people put so much thought into buying votes, when all that does it force the performer to perform in front of an empty house = no money. There are business models that have been around for centuries, they work. All this buying votes nonsense and coin stacking and people wanting handouts and miracle cures goes against everything that actually works.

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Exactly, those cheating authors using those cheating bid-bots cheated the steem economic model.

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Everyone knows: When you cheat, you win, and everyone respects you for it.

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That is true far more often than it should be.

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Everyone knows:

In retail: It's best to embrace the shoplifters and kick out the consumers. That's how you make money.

In videogames: You don't patch the exploits. Allows consumers to complain and hope they stop playing the game. That's how you make money.

Everyone knows this.

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I know you are being sarcastic but your original comment is really true. Look at Trevon James. Doesn’t matter how much he pushed the ponzi BitConnect (and even created a Steem Engine token to push BitConnect 2.0) even thou people lost millions and it is under a current lawsuit. As long as he can give votes or the chance of giving something of value people will forget and worship him.

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All of those people deserve to get scammed, if getting scammed is what they're into. Much like how so many here deserve to lose out on billions. That's what they want. Plagiarist still has 10x more rewards next to his post than I do with my previous post. I have no right to be frustrated with that. There's no reason for me to leave. Those other folks who left, thousands of them, good quality people, who cares about them. We need more scammers and corner cutters because those are the people who can build a strong foundation. Just look at the place. Two years of this and still going strong!

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That's why we need a downvote pool.

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We have downvotes. Was it my job the other day to downvote that plagiarist you promoted or was it your job to be responsible and not promote a plagiarist?

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As soon as we got the report, the account was blacklisted, but we can't blacklist what we don't know. Which is why it's so important that bad actors are being blacklisted as soon as possible.

However, this only works with services like Smartsteem (& buildawhale for example), that are actually blacklisting bad actors. For the rest, downvotes are needed. Because the accounts that are buying votes on their shit content and are receiving downvotes thus losing money, will learn from it; and the bid-bots that are voting on it, will realize that they're losing money by upvoting shit.

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Could I ask what you will do if all posts with vote-purchases start being down-voted after HF21? Will it be a case of accepting this as the new normal and moving on to a new dev project, or will you look to continue, perhaps by some change in the way the business operates?

There's been a lot of talk about how the EIP will affect vote-selling, particularly around high-trending posts, but I've seen relatively little from vote sellers themselves. I would be really interested to hear how vote-selling services expect HF21 to pan out.

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Could I ask what you will do if all posts with vote-purchases start being down-voted after HF21? Will it be a case of accepting this as the new normal and moving on to a new dev project, or will you look to continue, perhaps by some change in the way the business operates?

I think this is what some people get wrong. Smartsteem is not what I'm building my future on. It's a solid business model, and it most def. needs some remodelling after/before HF21, but I'm far more interested in Steem succeeding. Which is why we need the downvote pool, as I'm not able to influence anything else directly in the bid-bot/promotion sector besides my own project.

I would be really interested to hear how vote-selling services expect HF21 to pan out.

It will need re-modelling and whitelists/blacklists will become more important than ever, but I'm not able to predict what exactly will happen. Maybe people will start to flag everyone who uses promotion services. Or maybe they'll realize that people using it in moderation on good content is actually acceptable and valuable. However, I'm quite sure that bad content will be far less profitable to make money with.

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I asked you, with the question being directed to the Smartsteem account, if the money the plagiarist spent had been refunded. You/SmartSteem did not respond. I'm asking again. Was the money refunded?

If the money was not refunded, that means your business made more money promoting plagiarism than I did (and many others) who produced content today.

Just because someone loses money due to downvotes, that does not mean there's no money to be made in upvoting shit.

Nobody deserves to make money through plagiarism directly, or indirectly and that includes you.

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I asked you, with the question being directed to the Smartsteem account, if the money the plagiarist spent had been refunded. You/SmartSteem did not respond. I'm asking again. Was the money refunded?

No. Everybody who uses Smartsteem's services is accepting the Terms of Service, which includes a section about abuse.

3 Abuse Policy
(...)
No-refund situations are generally reserved for extreme cases which we identify as significant plagiarism, multiple posts per day using promotion services for very low-quality content (spamming our services), or posts which spread discrimination or hate speech. Smartsteem reserves the right to blacklist and remove votes without refunds in any situation Smartsteem deems as an extreme-case or abuse of Smartsteem services.


If the money was not refunded, that means your business made more money promoting plagiarism than I did (and many others) who produced content today.

No. Smartsteem didn't make anything, it actually lost money/revenue. 100% of liquid rewards are being distributed among delegations and the curation rewards were lost due to the unvote.

Nobody deserves to make money through plagiarism directly, or indirectly and that includes you.

Correct. But it depends of course how exactly the plagiarism was used - was it quoted as part of a blog post; or was it blatant plagiarism.

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The blacklist is fine and dandy but I'd prefer to see something a little more proactive rather than reactive. The plaigiarist will pout about losing money and getting caught, move some tokens around, and do it all over again. Blacklisting seems like a waste of resources and that time, energy and money spent could go to a more proactive approach. It's not hard to predict abuse, and we have proof of abuse over the span of years, and many have been calling for a stop to it, for years. The blacklist has been around almost the entire time this disaster of selling votes started. There's no good reason to hand over easy money to scumbags and leeches while forcing thousands of good people to sit back and watch it destroy the place, before they leave.

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was it your job to be responsible and not promote a plagiarist?

^this 100% this

Yeah but this no unvote bullshit is a huge part of the problem. Oh, but apparently curation rewards trumps doing the right thing and NOT promoting shitbirds posting diarrhea. Ffs

Oh, and !dramatoken

P.S. noticed I got notified on Steem.chat but haven't logged into that shit for weeks. I'll check it now and try to coordinate some flags on it.

Posted using Partiko Android

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Also, you can always report any plagiarism to steemcleaners and they can downvote it if you don't want to waste your voting power/risk retaliation.

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You don't think we know that already?

The problem is it's not enough on a heavily bid post.

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If you were not self-voting this and the next xomments, you would be in the negative...which would show what others really think of you. So why is it honest of you, but not honest of those of us who pay you to sell us votes?

Are you taking this position so as to protect your investment? I'm not saying you shoulld not...just wondering...

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Yes, literally! Everyone knows that! Duh! It's all so simple!!!

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Hey, it's fun to joke around and all that but I just noticed you delegate to Tipu bidbot and Tipu's vote hasn't been removed from the instance of plagiarism I recently found boosted up to the trending(joke) page. Here's a link with more information and a link leading to the instance of plagiarism can be found tucked neatly inside that post.

I would like to see that vote removed and the money the plagiarist spent on the vote should go to me because I'm awesome.

Thank you and have a wonderful evening.

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I don't delegate to tipU anymore. Those are residuals from prior delegations, I think via some issuance and dividends of tipU coins.

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Alright but if you know somebody who knows somebody, maybe they can get someone else to do something about it.

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@cardboard is the man you after

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That sounds like code talk. Is this agent cardboard easy to work with or should I wear a vest?

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I tried to message @cardboard, the owner of TipU, but no response thus far.

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The main reason this EIP was pitched was to mitigate bid bots.

Except it incentives bid-bots by making it financially necessary to make it to linear rewards.

How many top 20 witnesses are running a bid bot? If the EIP threatened their bottom line they would veto the hardfork, which is exactly why it obviously benefits them.

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EiP is threatening the bottom-line for traditional bid-bots owners & co FYI.

1.) Rewards will be reduced in general.
2.) A higher percentage of rewards will be dependant on how good the post is behaving; or whether it's being downvoted (big risk due to the downvote-pool).


Everybody can think what they want about myself and Smartsteem.com, but at this point in time, my actions and decisions are completely in line for the good of Steem. Otherwise, why am I still holding hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Steem?

I want this blockchain to succeed and its currencies to become more valuable! If this reduces the rewards people generate who aren't staked in the system at first, maybe that's a good thing, don't you think? Otherwise, Steem is just a place where free-loaders can get some STEEM & SBD posting content without risk, while stakeholders are the ones taking the beating since they're locked in at the same time as other cryptocurrencies have a bull-run.

EiP will take steps in the direction of people wanting to be a hodlers of Steem and I'd say that's a very good thing for us.

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Otherwise, Steem is just a place where free-loaders can get some STEEM & SBD posting content without risk...

That's what Steem originally was. That's what it is now. And bid bots make it possible for staked and non-staked users alike to increase their risk-free liquid rewards. We don't need bid bots and their owners to "protect" any investments/investors here. In fact, they are one of the largest contributors of negative value to the platform, thanks to the largest contributors: STINC and our past top-20 witnesses that approved the delegation, linear rewards curve, and 10-vote daily target protocols, which paved the way for the anti-social and cannibalistic economic behavior we see today.

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delegation, linear rewards curve, and 10-vote daily target protocols

None of these actually matter much, they just shift around the methods that milkers will use but with automation, vote selling, reward-sharing schemes, etc. this was always going to turn out badly.

The only rule set remotely likely the voted content rewarding model that we have (as opposed to other completely different models like paid boosting) that has a shadow of a chance to work has significantly higher curation and cheaper/free downvotes.

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None of these actually matter much, they just shift around the methods that milkers will use but with automation, vote selling, reward-sharing schemes, etc. this was always going to turn out badly.

Well, that's my point. It turned out badly because those protocol changes made it much easier and much more lucrative for the "milkers."

Delegation made it possible for non-invested users to rent stake and run vote-selling bots practically risk- and accountability-free. It also allowed entities like STINC and users like Freedom/Pumpkin to gift or rent out their previously and mostly unused influence, further diluting all other stakeholder influence. I think you're aware of how that distorts and influences markets and development in a variety of ways.

(I say "risk-free" because promising liquid payments for renting SP is a stakeholder's dream. You can keep your stake powered up and still cash out the rewards earned from it...with no actual "contributing" effort to the blockchain/content required. It's essentially a circumvention of DPoS.)

Linear rewards made it possible to precisely calculate vote values and offer them for sale at a "fair market value." It also makes "guaranteed ROI" possible - which further allows for easy automation.

The 10-vote target made that delegated voting power and vote value 4x more valuable for "promoting" content. It allows bid bots to push the poor content to the top and mostly out-compete "organic" curation.

So I do think these protocols matter...a lot. Yes, we had other issues of buying/selling votes before, but not nearly at this current scale and with this much visibility. This bold move of "bringing it out of the shadows" has been a disaster. Not only is it horrible for perception, but it doesn't accurately depict the type or the amount of backroom trading that may have taken place previously - and that we were unaware of - which was likely relatively minimal.

Instead of cleaning things up via transparency, it made things actually appear exponentially filthier.

Instead of giving more influence to less-invested users, it apparently has made those users see the game as even more rigged.

Instead of attracting, retaining, and cultivating more active users, we simply have more former users going off and creating their own chains, using other chains instead, and/or spreading the word about how awful Steem has become. And we thought users didn't like Steem before the 2017 hard forks. Even the people still here can barely stand the place.

I get what you're saying, but if we really want to fix the economic protocols/incentives, we can't continue ignoring the protocol changes that completely broke the system and what little social atmosphere we had prior to those changes.

Also - this is a perfect example of why multiple large code changes shouldn't be made in one fork. And a great example of why we should be able to evaluate new behavior and revert back to previous protocols when things break or don't work as planned.

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Delegation made it possible for non-invested users to rent stake and run vote-selling bots practically risk- and accountability-free

This could already be done and was already being done with vote bots where users signed up with their posting authority. Delegating your SP to a vote bot (in exchange for pay) and giving a vote bot the ability to vote with your own account (in exchange for pay) are essentially identical. It was already happening on a moderate scale prior to delegation and what changed things (including the scale) between then and now was not so much delegation, but the passage of three years of time with more and more people recognizing value of taking maximum advantage of the incentives offered, and then doing so. That was and is inevitable given broken incentives with or without delegation.

Delegation was never at the core of the problem, though it may have contributed in a small way.

But realistically if we want to improve things now (years late I think we will both agree), we need not relitagate the mistakes of the past, however we might personally rank their severity.

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What will incentivize people to power up steem from these changes?

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Higher curation rewards, which means you'll earn more money with your stake by voting than before.

Since SPS is being introduced as well, and the inflation is being shifted partly from the reward-pool (author & curation) to the SPS, it might look like the curation rewards haven't changed or have become less. But they are indeed bigger and the SPS is supposed to be a net positive for the Steem ecosystem, which hopefully includes an increased STEEM valuation over time.

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The shift from author to curator is numerically much larger than the shift from author+curator to SPS. Curators will see an immediate and obvious net increase, not quite double but close to it.

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What exactly will there be left to power up?

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If you're referring to author-rewards; you will still earn much more than on any other platform. Besides that, you can also power up Steem which you've bought or earned in another way (Steem Monsters, etc.)

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Hmm, no. STEEM is failing to onboard top content creators from add revenue sharing platforms, and the EIP will only make this worse. It is failing to onboard many good fiction authors and convince them to go STEEM first with their fiction at the expense of sales on Amazon KDP, Play Books and Apple iBooks.

This I feel is the bigest mistake Steemit keeps making, forgetting it is a content platform that needs to actually compete for top content creators with the likes of Google, Amazon and Apple.

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I don't think we need more onboarding. We can't even keep those who are onboarded active. Activity is needed.

Figure out how to have active users rather than mere account holders.

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whether it's being downvoted (big risk due to the downvote-pool).

Downvotes will be bought and sold on the open market for a big discount.

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This is all just narative. Simulate it with some old data and see how the incentives pan out. The only real incentives the EIP creates favor the bid bot economy. It could be easily fixed I feel by making down votes hit curation harder than the author.

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That sort of simulation is entirely worthless because it doesn't account for changing behavior, which is the entire point of it.

Downvotes absolutely should hit the author (as well as the other curators, but not to the extent of favoring the author). The fundamental goal of both upvotes and downvotes is to pay authors in accordance with a stake-weighted consensus of value contributed. Downvoters are contributing their opinion into that consensus process that the payout to the author is too high.

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That method shows us exactly what behaviour will be first to be incentified to be changed, and you can start reasoning from that. People don't change behaviour because of eloquent narrative about incentives meant to change their behaviour, they change behaviour because of actual stimuli acting on their existing behaviour.

That same method could have warned us about the disaster that was HF20. I feel it quite worrying, especially after our HF20 that anyone still could consider real-data simulations "useless". They aren't just usefull, they are essential to preventing what is perfectly predictable.

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At best it is of minimal value in these situations.

Take downvotes for example. A number I saw recently was 0.008% of votes being downvotes, essentially zero. Running a simulation over that data will tell you nothing about downvotes because (for practical purposes) no one uses them. Only after the cost structure attached to downvotes changes will, possibly, the usage of downvotes change, and nothing in the historical data will tell us how it will change or how much.

HF20 is a very different type of situation. Very little of HF20 was intended to or could reasonably be expected to change behavior via incentives on a widespread scale. What it did do is block certain actions (spamming mostly) which meant that it wouldn't even be possible to simulate in that way, because many of the previous recorded actions in the history would be blocked, resulting in a chain state from that point forward deviating from the historical state. Many subsequent actions in history would then become invalid, leading to further rejections and deviation.

One must use the right sorts of tools in any situation. Historical replay as you suggest is the right tool for some problems and the wrong one for others.

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How many top 20 witnesses are running a bid bot?

You've hit the nail on the head as to why the EIP may have been carefully reworked, or even didn't properly address this issue in the first place.

At the end of the day, until these practices are weeded out nothing will change! At this point will we never get a chance to find out what a reward system that de-centivizes vote selling even looks like, when so many of the top 100 witnesses make their bread and butter running vote selling services. As you say, they will just veto the hardfork if it threatens their interests.

Or maybe I'm wrong? Not sure I care at this point.

Posted using Partiko Android

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Is there a list or way to find out which top 100 witnesses are running bid bots? I may want to rethink some of my votes..!

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I don't think there is tbh meanbees... Not that I know of anyway. If you visit bot pages some are clear who run them, others less so.

Posted using Partiko Android

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I'm behind Smartsteem.com, but I've always been very open about it (https://therealwolf.me/projects, https://smartsteem.com/about). Most people don't know this, but I actually thought quite a few times about stopping it altogether. However, the truth is that this wouldn't change anything. It would simply shift more weight to those bid-bot/promotion actors who are not caring at all about removing promotion/votes from abusers/plagiarists/spammers. In contrast, Smartsteem has already blacklisted quite a lot of people:
https://github.com/smartsteem/blacklist

And there are indeed good actors who are relying on promotion services to get seen!

Now, it's true that it could be done more and better. And I'm always trying to improve the process. However, if I'd blacklist everyone who even slightly promotes a bit too much, (not referring to real abusers) I'm not sure if Smartsteem would have any more customers. Which would have the same result as quitting all-together, since delegators & vote-sellers wouldn't earn as much in comparison to other actors who are allowing anything, so people would switch over.

But with the downvote pool, even those actors (who previously didn't care) would be somewhat forced to use a blacklisting system, which means Smartsteem could be even stricter!

Now, I obv. can't guarantee that it will work out exactly like this, but I do believe (& hope) so, which is why I'm in favour of the EiP. It will not make the life of the average bid-bot operators easier, in contrast, it will make it more difficult.

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The promotion services do more harm to Steem than good at this point. The whole point of organic curation is for people to distinguish between good and bad content. If Smart Steem is just going to upvote as a service then we have no way to determine good or bad content. Anything can get visible.

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We need to fix the economics so this isn't viable. As long as it is viable, someone will do it.

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Just as true is the fact that with downvotes (flagging) now being free of cost to the flagger, many are downvoting just for the sake of feeding their ego (or, as it could also be said, because they are on a power trip). Just imagine, you are not capable of writing anything original, so you attack those who do and threaten to attack those who protest such action by you...and...voila, you are the big boy and oh so influential.

All I see is Steemit getting less and less posts - when I joined, after submitting my post, I would get shown a list of new posts and if I missed out on a post and went looking for it, it had disappeared because of so many new posts being made. Now I submit, check out a few of the posts and when, a couple of hours later, I post again, I see a few new posts in the list....but then I am back to those I saw hours ago - which means there is a massive drop in posters.

It will be interesting to see how things go once more than 50% of the original posters, still posting, give up on Steemit. I guess the curators can then curate each other and enjoy having themselves flagged?

Not my scene....and have already signed up elsewhere. Just trying to work out how to maintain contact with a few friends I value, who are still here.

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For every man that earns a dollar without working there is a man that did work that didnt get paid his dollar.

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Why not develop an app or script to reject all witnesses who endorse vote selling?

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I'm not involved with any bid bot, but I don't think it really matters if others are. I'm more interested in the overall economics and how it functions at a system-wide level than in who happens to be doing what.

This person or that person running a bid bot literally doesn't matter. If the economics favor it, that creates a valuable niche. If one person doesn't fill that niche, someone else surely will.

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If the economics favor it, that creates a valuable niche. If one person doesn't fill that niche, someone else surely will.

The vote selling economy on steem is not a valuable niche... it's a bleed of value. That bleed happens both in the talent that leaves this platform due to the fact that quality isn't rewarded manually, and steem Blockchains reputation in the wider world. I've noticed this same attitude among a lot of devs and some of the witnesses... + dapp owners etc. It's blinkered to assume that steem Blockchain primary usecase and best UC is not content. Therefore quality content should be nurtured by those with stake to create a virtuous cycle (eg when people see professional level content get curie awards they strive to improve to try and get those awards).

Bidbots drive away decent content creators. Simple fact. Curie can only encourage them up to a point... beyond that point they leave. I know this because I've been a curie curator for over a year... I've seen it again and again. Those people who claim bidbots aren't the problem obviously haven't seen the multitude of posts I have where talented people anounce they're leaving because they've discovered that votes are bought on here. I've seen tones of them while searching for curie.

To put it super simple, the vote buying system on steem sacrifices legitimate long term growth of the price of steem for short term gains for a few people.

If publishing houses invested in this space (to source or promote authors) it would lead to huge $ value. If legitimate film interests invested in this space (to promote independent film festivals or up & coming directors etc) it would lead to huge $ value. If steem somehow leveraged streaming entertainment (similar to YouTube) it would lead to huge $ value. I only have one instance of proof that vote buying is why they run a mile and that is in the publishing industry... I talked about that in my other comment in this thread.

I'll tell you what will lead to the continued devaluing of all our investments. Allowing the best content creators to be continually devalued and driven away by the fact that people with a tone of SP just want to sit back and watch money come in with little to no work. That's what vote selling is all about.

If one person doesn't fill that niche, someone else surely will.

Yeah sure, if they're allowed to. Stinc and a handful of the most stake wealthy on steem could use their SP (downvotes) to stop bidbots if they chose to. But half of those stake wealthy people I speak off are involved or run bidbots so we're kind of fucked. Also their hefty stake weighted witness votes could remove the witnesses who perpetuate vote selling from the top 100 and send a message, but they don't because half of those stake wealthy people I speak off are involved or run bidbots.

You say it doesn't matter @smooth, you're wrong. But this comment isn't really aimed at you per say, these are thoughts that have been gestating in my mind the past 24 hours watching the comments on this thread.

This is the last I'll say on the subject.

Posted using Partiko Android

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The vote selling economy on steem is not a valuable niche

I'm quite sure you misunderstood my intent here. I meant valuable in the sense that people can make money doing it. I didn't mean valuable in the sense of valuable to Steem overall.

Yeah sure, if they're allowed to

You should better understand what the permissionless property of blockchains means. No one needs to be 'allowed' to do anything, they can just do it. The only way in which it can be stopped is by changing to system rules and incentives to make it a smaller or non-existent niche.

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Fair enough dude. I don't say these things to get some drama tokens 😉

But these issues I highlight are very real and they need addressing fully now! Especially with Facebook trying to enter crypto and Eos coming with voice.

I want to see everyone's investment in steem bring huge returns! Not just a few people getting moderate returns, as steem is driven out of the space and loses that first mover advantage.

I've spent nearly 2 years putting a huge amount of time in never powered down. I'm not the only person to put such time and effort in, I'm sure you have.

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I don't need to better understand it, I understand it very well!

You should better understand what the permissionless property of blockchains means. No one needs to be 'allowed' to do anything, they can just do it.

I addressed this above when I said stinc and high stake people could stop vote buying by excersising their right to be allowed to downvote both the people who run these 'so called' services, and the people who use them! That would be them exercising power in a permissionless environment. It would exercise a measure of control, and considering stinc have had massive stake lying around for 2 years doing nothing it boggles my mind why they haven't at least attempted to stop something that is so obviously of detriment to both the platform and the price of the steem. Obvs that would start a whole new discussion about if we're now centralized... but I feel that the stake distribution on steem (and the ninja mining by more than just stinc) means that ship has sailed.

The only way in which it can be stopped is by changing to system rules and incentives to make it a smaller or non-existent niche.

This is true to an extent, but what I said about responsible use of downvote to stop negative 'niches' from proliferating is valid.

The network effect is what can truly make steem a wold class platform. An ever expanding network of people sharing content, and the advertising that would bring and other investment streams is what can catapult steem to overtake Facebook. This isn't rocket science. It also follows that as steem's value proposition is to actually pay people for their content, we need to fulfill that value proposition to succeed.

I know that there are issues to do with balance between stake flowing out and stake being converted into SP, also the relative lack of trading of steem as a token.

But, as I stated in a comment above, if the issue of steem being a fundamentally unappealing place for content creators doesn't change soon, we will lose any first mover advantage to facebook coin or voice.

I don't disagree that the best way to change all of this is to make the system not reward vote selling/delegating behavior... and better reward manual curation or delegating to a guild that does the work for you, I'm just unsure this HF21 will achieve that, and if it doesn't... well the clock is ticking.

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Steemit always intended their stake to be non-voting, in fact they implemented a feature into the blockchain code to enforce that. For various reasons the feature was never used, but the tradition of not voting with their stake remains. That tradition exists for a reason, at least historically. With the dominant stake they once had, if they did vote, no one else would have any meaningful say at all in anything. So for that reason, and because the stake was mined for the purpose of funding the company, compensating their founders, and giving away to new users, they have never voted (apart from a few specific exceptions, mostly emergencies).

Even despite that tradition, they do delegate a large amount of stake to steemcleaners and some other downvoting efforts. It simply numerically isn't enough. I haven't done an exact calculation but my intuition is that bidbots alone have more stake than Steemit (recall that Steemit has sold a lot and continues to sell a lot; the meme about Steemit having an absurdly dominant stake like 80% as they once did is complete wrong), and bidbots are not the only problem.

Trying to solve this the way you suggest would not work and has not worked. Working against the underlying incentives by trying to tell people what you think they should do with their stake despite incentives encouraging them to do something else is inefficient to the point of ineffective, even if you are ultimately right in a way. It is like trying to push a car uphill several miles to get to a repair shop but collapsing from physical exhaustion before you get there, when you could instead roll it downhill to another shop at the bottom of the hill.

I share some of your lack of certainty about whether HF21/EIP will produce the intended and desired results but I think they are worth a try. We should have tried making such improvements long ago, but since we have not, there is no time like the present.

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I do and do not agree with you.

I have spent most of my time at Steemit without buying any votes. I remember what a rush it would be to get a vote from curators who had read my story and liked it.

But then...they seemed to die out.

Writing the same quality posts as before, but getting just a few no_value -or small_value votes, without comments from readers anymore, it made me lose interest in posting.

Only then did I learn about SmartMarket. So we now talk about how they make us authors big money. Where? How?

If I send SmartMarket Steem10 for a post, I get back (usually, but not always) my Steem10 plus a ROI of between 5% to 10% (in other words, 0.50c to Steem1. ) One Steem has been roughly $0.30 to 0.40....which means, uhm...how many must I buy, at what cost to me, for me to earn enough to buy one cup of coffee per week?

And I am breaking the bank? !!!

I have not withdrawn even one SP for taking to buy a coffee or buy myself food. But because I treat the buying of votes as a part of doing business on Steemit, I am destroying Steemit?

At least, from me, if your tastes coincide with mine, you can read some stories, poems and some controversial political opinions to stir your blood.

What exactly is it you Flaggers and curators provide? I hardly ever see any of you, so I know you do not support those who write original material - unless it is about Crypto.

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I remember what a rush it would be to get a vote from curators who had read my story and liked it. But then...they seemed to die out.

I sympathize, I really do. I also never get curie votes anymore... but I can tell you why they dry up after a while as I'm a curator. Below is the curation guidelines from the curie official discord, if a curator gets too many rejections from the reviewers they get kicked out, so you are incentivized as a curator to follow those guidelines. @curie focus on new authors with exceptional content because they don't have (delegated) enough SP to support great writers in perpetuity!

Guidelines - June 3
1) Verified and engaged authors only who have been consistent without much success of late. Focus is on new authors who have made few good posts, but haven't been discovered yet. Posts from the high REP authors have to be exceptional.
2) Posts must be more than 30 minutes old, but less than 72 hours old, with maximum $2 pending payout.
3) Only original content. Articles, art, poetry, videos, recipes, etc. that appear first on Steemit. (I.e. no reposts of older work) Please check for plagiarism and reposting before submitting. Content must be exceptional and unique.
4) No Steemit-related, religious or political posts.
5) English posts only.

But because I treat the buying of votes as a part of doing business on Steemit, I am destroying Steemit?

No I'm not attacking people for working within a broken system, I'm saying that if the system can be made to not reward that behavior and whales can be forced to actually curate, or delegate to curation guilds so that they can do the work for them, people like you and me, will have much better chance to be rewarded for high quality writing.

At least, from me, if your tastes coincide with mine, you can read some stories, poems

Right back at ya. I've been writing poetry and fiction on steem for just shy of 2 years, I'm not sure I've ever had a comment from on any of my content from you. There is a problem with not enough content consumers on steem, if we had the readership of medium.com it might be different, but as it is now every author on steem has to be sooooo active reading others and networking to even get a sniff at engagement and reasonable payouts. This is part of why you might not get much engagement, it is a networking game right now.

What exactly is it you Flaggers and curators provide? I hardly ever see any of you, so I know you do not support those who write original material.

I do and do not agree with this lol. I've never flagged in my life, so far as what curators do.... well look at that list of stipulations above and you'll see that every one of your curie rewards when you were newer to the platform had someone behind it doing a full plagerism check, going through a check list of other criteria like working back through the links on steem homepage to make sure that you can be verified as who you say you are by checking if you have an intro post etc. Using google to check sections of the text to see if it's old material reposted from a website. There is a fck tone of work goes on behind the scenes and the curation guilds are pretty much the only entities ensuring that anyone has those great moments when something of high quality they've created (art, video, writing) gets a decent amount of valuable votes.

Everything I'm saying in the comments in this thread is geared toward trying to get across to any high-ups reading that the vote selling needs to stop, not to attack people like you who have legitimately started buying votes out of sheer frustration, but in the hopes that if it gets sorted the massive amounts of SP delegated to bidbots will end up being used to reward people manually based on the quality of what they are producing.

P.s. I also haven't taken anything out of the steem platform that I haven't put back later. A little out which I traded with and increased my BTC stores but I put more back in than I originally took out. I honestly understand why you're frustrated with the penny payouts on your posts.

so I know you do not support those who write original material - unless it is about Crypto.

Go look at my blog to see how many, and who I comment on and engage with. I do agree that the crypto, and steem posts, get a lot more notice which is stupid as no one outside of steem is interested in that stuff. It boggles my mind that people don't see how insular it all is and how damaging this is for attracting mainstream people to our platform.

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I apologise - many times that I used the word 'you', it was because I was/am aware that many others who are attacking authors will be reading, so I was writing for a wider audience. My error was in not specifically saying so.

I checked to see why your name does not ring a bell. You are right, I have never, that I recall, read anything of yours.

First of all, I mostly read/write SF&F stories - but not in poetry. Poetry has more of an emotional and spiritual side to it.

I orginally came to steemit because I had spent nearly 18 years writing my novel (it is about 13 books, of over 700 pages each). I lost my money and that is how I ended up writing, so as to have somethingt o do. It started that way, but then I fell in love with my characters. Writing all day and night, developed me to the point where I was having lucid dreams about them - and those adventures I had shared with them, became part of their story.

I had no way to publish and there is a limited market for my kind of writing, so I was excited when I learnt about the blockchain and saw it as a way of keeping my books available even after I die.

Two years of publishing every day and I am only close to the end of posting of Book 2.

I also, for a long time, devoted time every day for helping new posters. This was where I saw the bad effects of flagging. For instance, Bernie flagged a Nigerian who wrote an article to help Africans feed themselves by using a tiny piece of land. He knocked the guy to zero Rep and try as I did to help, I was obviously too weak. Bernie said he flagged because he felt like it and I in turn was threatened, as does the trash guy, who also threatens he will attack anyone siding with the person he trashed. I checked and he has a delagation given to him of SP25,000. Coincidence? But he actually trashed someone who spoke out against Bernie....

The number of nasty people on Steemit is far greater than most know, I do not know why I fight back but nobody, to this date, has flagged me to death, but it does not make me more tolerant of them. It just makes me feel I am wasting my time here.

Since I no longer believe I will earn anything to top up my state pension, I do not really care about the upvotes. For instance, today I posted a very short story. I got about 40 upvotes. Only one of them means anything to me, as that person read and made a comment. The rest just have stuck me on an upvote bot...with even some of them never appearing on steemit anymore.

I would prefer to be on a platfrom where they are open about it being a cut throat battle of wits, than this pretence of caring about new or poor posters, when most use them as soft targets to vent their evil moods on them, knowing they cannot fight back.

As from the date of rewards changing to 50 / 50 I will ensure nobody can reward me at all, so no bogus curator can earn anything, while I still get my story posted and preserved for a while.

Thanks for answering me and I wish you the best on Steemit.

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If I send SmartMarket Steem10 for a post, I get back (usually, but not always) my Steem10 plus a ROI of between 5% to 10% (in other words, 0.50c to Steem1. )

So you're essentially guaranteed a 5-10% ROI on every post you make? Do you not see this as a problem? Is this not virtually risk-free for you?

I understand that curators (and users in general) have mostly disappeared - and that's a problem with incentives, interface usability, marketing (the lack thereof), and the general downward direction of STEEM prices over the past year and a half. But what you're telling me is that any user can sign up, create a post, and then buy their way to 5-10% profits on an exploitation of platform incentives and rewards.

This is precisely why the system is failing us.

But because I treat the buying of votes as a part of doing business on Steemit, I am destroying Steemit?

I'm not sure that posting content and buying votes for it is "doing business." And I don't think it's you or people like you that are "destroying Steemit." It's the package of protocols that were pushed and implemented in 2017 that are the problem - and the people who created and approved them. The protocols must be changed in order to correct the mistakes and restore balance to the system. That's not an attack on any individual or group of users. It's just the reality that we're in. I think too many people are trying to assign blame to regular users when their behavior today was just a natural and predicted consequence of adopting bad protocols.

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For my first year here I was earning more than 0.50c perpost...and I did not risk my own SP (yes, a few times I did lose when buying, so ROI is not guaranteed). My writing has not changed to any great extent, but if I do not buy any votes, I rarely make even 10 to 15cents. I am not willing to spend hours on preparing a post for 10c and since the whales are buying votes, then so will I - until it is stopped...and then I will block ALL payments to me, so that nobody else benefits.

That is my decision, so what happens, I have nothing to worry about - except that it means I will not be able to help a few really needy posters from poor countries. I accept it as a cost of the way steemit has gone....

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The idea behind the curve is mostly to bring all profitable voting behavior into the light to be scrutinized by everyone with their free downvotes.

The curve by itself is not expected to bring about honest voting practices alone. I can't see a very strong level of superlinear not favoring bid bots, even if we weren't at all concerned about voting equality, so I'm not sure why it should be considered.

The idea is to have enough free downvotes at any given time to push contentious content at least down to the point where they'll be making more curating honestly instead (buffed to 50%).

Convergent linear is meant to just prevent the ability to hide vote farming in micro spam comments relatively undetected.

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I agree with you that 16 Steem is arbitrary and probably too low. Why not 60 Steem? Why not 30 Steem? How was 16 Steem arrived at?

If the price of Steem keeps going down then are we going to re-adjust?

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This doesn't really need to adjust to the price of Steem because the idea is to limit the number of content elements which can be profitably rewarded by milkers (to in turn limit the amount of effort required by altruistic volunteer abuse fighters). That's a function of the size of the reward pool which is a set amount of STEEM. The price doesn't change that.

To put rough numbers on this the reward pool is about 50k STEEM per day. If the cutoff is 16 STEEM that means there can't be more than 3000 content items which are milking candidates (and probably less since rewards will be somewhat concentrated, not spread out evenly on 3000 comments). That's a number (or really a range) that is likely feasible for abuse fighters to keep on top of. 300k would not be.

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Please define "milkers" because this is a new category. Couldn't any participant be accused of "milking" with such a broad word and unclear definition? I think first people need to define all these phrases and put it in public so it is known what exactly the abuse fighters are fighting against.

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Basically people who use the system to generate interest on their stake rather than to reward value contributions. That can take various forms, and most involve some degree of self-voting or vote-selling, but the exact scheme isn't that significant.

What is relevant here is to simply limit the number of content items that can potentially generate a high-efficiency return in this manner. If such returns can be broken up in too many pieces (without losing value to some form of superlinear curve), then downvoting that relies on mostly altruistic volunteer effort will be overwhelmed.

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But then what happens to the content itself? I see this as reactionary and a bandaid solution which does not improve content or increase retention. Do you not notice less people are generating content now?

It's because content producers are moving to other competing platforms.

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What happens to the content is that hopefully some of it gets rewarded instead of having much of the reward pool milked out by stakeholders paying themselves, effectively draining rewards away from all content.

Whatever else is going on with other platforms is interesting and worth paying attention to, but doesn't really change much about the mechanisms that do or don't work on Steem. We can't simply wish for value adding content to be rewarded, we need a mechanism that actually does that, which is what this is attempting to do.

It isn't guaranteed to work it is the most credible effort to date in my opinion.

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Maybe as a first SPS proposal we should seek to hire an economist to fix the Steem economy. It could cost something to hire a full time economist but could be worth it.

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But this “2e12” algorithm will have practically zero effect on bid bots

To address this specific point, the convergent linear curve has literally nothing to do with bid bots. Its intent is to address profitable low level reward milking using enormous numbers of comments spread widely where they are hard to find. This is much harder to deal with using downvotes, since even with the free downvotes in the proposal, downvoting is still unrewarded so relies on altruism and voluntary effort. Bidbots are pretty much the opposite, as their function is to push posts to the higher end of the payout distribution.

I think $6 (if that is indeed the right number, I've seen conflicting claims) is probably more than enough for this.

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Are far as I understand it and seen it pitched, the curve has nothing to do with bid bots. The curve is to prevent discourage large stake holders from splitting their stake to smaller accounts and voting their own spam.

Under this curve they would penalized for smaller votes that are easier to stay under the radar with. Thus forcing them to use larger votes to optimize rewards. The discounted downvotes included would be able to put further pressure on this behavior.

There was no numbers until this post to know why is considered a smaller amount to understand what it means in reality.

That’s how I understood the curve presented up to now.

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The "dividing account abuse" explanation has never really made much sense to me. A large stakeholder who is willing to go to such lengths to obtain something close to 100% of upvote will most likely just find another avenue if that particular one closes. Circular voting or vote selling (off-chain if necessary) will still be possible.

However the impact on real small accounts, new accounts, and engagement through comments will be substantial. I would argue that the pros of the CLRC change do not match up to the cons and it is a part of the EIP that could be dropped, without dramatically altering the main pillars of the proposed change.

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Circular vs. self-voting isn't the point at all. The point is solely that everything is visible so it can be downvoted if the content itself (or at least the story surrounding it) doesn't justify the reward. Who makes the votes using which account or which third party voting service literally doesn't matter here.

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The point is solely that everything is visible so it can be downvoted

At which point the abuser will stop doing it, most likely. Which is good. And then they will do something else to obtain a similar level of rewards (circular voting / vote-selling are just examples of such methods that are still likely to be employable under HF21).

As such I think that the benefit brought by the CLRC change is very small. The cons of that part of the EIP outweigh the pros.

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Vote selling and circular voting themselves aren't bad and can't be stopped in any case. So we posit that as a given. Vote selling, etc. that results in payouts divorced from content value is the problem, and can be countered with downvotes as long as it is highly visible which is why some form of superlinear is needed (I'm not arguing for this specific curve or parameters; at this point I'm not even sure I correctly understand what they are).

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The benefits of the CLRC just seem to me to be small compared to the costs.

Under the above example the abuser continues to extract the same value from the system, just through a different method. There is no increase in altruism, nor in manual voting, nor any redistribution of value from the abuser to content creators. Maybe it looks slightly better on the surface but the underlying economics are unchanged.

The costs on the other hand seem high. Reductions in payouts for smaller earners which is likely to include new accounts. Reductions in payouts on comments, harming engagement and reducing Steem's effectiveness as a social network. Reductions in the power of minnows and dolphins to reward content without significant levels of consensus and the influence of whales.

Given the blockchain data is transparent some form of automated data analytics could be used to find such abusers. Combined with automated free downvotes this could go a long way to resolving the issue without all the above costs.

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Under the above example the abuser continues to extract the same value from the system, just through a different method

Not sure which example you are talking about but as long as it is highly visible then we need to take into account the effect of downvotes (also BTW the deterrent effect of downvotes even if there aren't actual downvotes in one particular case). Some superlinear curve (not necessarily this exact one) has the effect of ensuring that anything that isn't highly visible can't get full value, so it eliminates the possible loophole here.

Given the blockchain data is transparent some form of automated data analytics could be used to find such abusers

Sounds very difficult, complicated, and to the extent it requires ongoing effort, relying largely on altruism and volunteer work, as all anti-abuse efforts do.

The objective benefits of 100% preventing atomized milking with one fairly simple measure are pretty clear to me, but I might not agree that the parameters are set ideally in the proposed fork.

EDIT:

BTW I'm not sold on this:

Reductions in payouts for smaller earners which is likely to include new accounts. Reductions in payouts on comments, harming engagement and reducing Steem's effectiveness as a social network

Most social networks pay out literally nothing. If there are small payouts on new accounts, comments, etc., and there are still likely to be even with the new curve, just as there were some even under the old and far more extreme n^2 curve, I might argue that it has roughly the same effect (the appeal being to earning something from you interaction instead of nothing) as slightly larger payouts. We sort of ran the experiment on whether flattening the curve would dramatically increase retention and engagement and found the result mostly negative (no dramatic improvement).

That's ignoring that EIP is very much intended to offset the reduction by increasing these payouts due to less milking (even though it may increase other payouts by more).

I honestly doubt that the specific amount of small payouts either way has a meaningful effect on engagement (and if it does it is probably fake engagement people are manufacturing for the purpose of generating payouts), though I certainly can understand that people getting these payouts would prefer more rather than less, were all else equal. All else isn't equal though, there are other considerations here.

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Are far as I understand it and seen it pitched, the curve has nothing to do with bid bots.

I'm just going by what I've read on @steemitblog posts and their comment sections, in the posts and comment sections of other users, and in off-chain chats.

The curve is to prevent discourage large stake holders from splitting their stake to smaller accounts and voting their own spam.

Yeah...it would have been great if this same reasoning wasn't summarily dismissed by Ned/STINC back in 2017 when they rammed linear rewards down our throats without ever addressing why there was a wholesale change of protocol rationale and coherence.

Oh, wait...Ned did explain it a few times by saying previous protocols were "evil." So there's that, I guess.

Anyway...for the record: I don't care that a lot of people favor these changes because they think it will impact bid bots. I am in favor of more-than-linear and 50/50 rewards because it just makes sense economically and because of the ability to mitigate "abuse."

I was in favor of these protocols 2.5 years ago when I wrote about them. Hopefully, we'll get back to some of the rest of those ideas that were ignored back then and actually improve things around here. I doubt anything meaningful will happen though. It seems that Steem may be headed for obsolescence due to a plethora of "leadership" mistakes and non-existent marketing. If we're lucky though, maybe this place could be fun again in the distant future.

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The reason why linear was introduced is the exact same reason why the Whale Experiment ran. When hf 17 came out not long after Dan left the most demanded change by the community, linear, was missing. This is what prompted the Whale Experiment. The demand for linear was directly tied to the chasm that exponential caused in voting power. Yes it was a naive overcorrection and it should have been retooled long ago, but here we are, let's learn from the past (that the community demands should be more thoroughly examined) and move forward.

Onwards and upwards.

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it would have been great if this same reasoning wasn't summarily dismissed by Ned/STINC back in 2017

Lots of things would be great in the past. Can we deal with the present now?

I am in favor of more-than-linear and 50/50 rewards because it just makes sense economically

Agreed.

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well as i was thinking with my primary school math (i ignored it after) acc that does not get to 6.5$ will be:


and well that is a huge amount of accounts, strange but it is.
but we all know that big acc will get to the rescue and vote for all those small acc...

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Ha! Citations? Evidence? Public forums?! Polling? Logs? What are those?!

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The HF21 Testnet EIP portion needs some work. In short what exactly do we gain here? Is it going to somehow increase the price of the Steem token? Is it going to bring more activity not merely more new accounts? What is going to be done to reward actual activity?

The reward curve seems not good for rewarding activity or how else do we explain why activity is much lower? What would create more economic activity? SMTs? How does this EIP help?

I think keeping the interest for long term holding is essential. The more power up incentives there are the more the price of Steem can go up. No one has given much thought into the forever falling price of Steem?

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In short what exactly do we gain here?

Decreasing author's reward.

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I am not a tech guru to understand all the background - usually I trust your conclusion @ats-david, one thing I want to know more is:

You are in favor of the 50/50 content rewards split.

WHY? I do not see any value to this, are you really confident this will help content discovery or encourage anyone to manually search and vote valuable content at all?

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I’ve talked about this for about two and a half years, but this is basically why I’m in favor of higher curation rewards:

If we want more and better curation, we need to incentivize it. If we want more investment, we need to incentivize it. And if we truly understand that social media is not comprised of 100% bloggers and commenters – that the simple act of voting on content is actually the largest chunk of interaction – then we need to make it more lucrative for content consumers to easily invest and earn for the quality work that they contribute.

Curation rewards are that mechanism for bringing in more investors, for likely keeping them more engaged, and for bringing in a wider base of users that are not solely here to create low-quality content and not promote it, then hope for big rewards...and then ultimately become disappointed for not earning from their lack of quality, effort, and experience with social media and networking.

That excerpt was taken from here:
https://steemit.com/steem/@ats-witness/block-change-you-can-believe-in

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I sincerely hope you are right - many of the content creators feel curation is not happening at all - now they might get less they might leave - if the price goes up by 3-4 times as of the change - perfect. I simply have only doubts this incentives to curate "manually" will ever happen. Thanks for replying!!

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Better curation, but no one creating content anymore. Good plan.

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Why wouldn't anyone create content if rewards were split 50/50?

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Because under the new system, it seems that if one person gives you a 1 USD upvote, you will only get 0.27 USD instead of 0.75 USD. That's a big difference.

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I don't think your math is correct.

But you're telling me that people will not post because they'll "only" be getting $0.27 (or 27% of the stated payout, according to you) for a post nobody sees instead of nothing at all most everywhere else? I'd be willing to bet against this claim.

I also don't think that you're taking into account that better incentives for stakeholders likely means additional positive price pressure for STEEM, which would make each of those "1 USD upvotes" more than 1 USD.

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Well the math seems to be confirmed. Someone replied to my question and it is true :( Do not forget I just gave one example, it might be difficult for some to get "something" because the don't get to the 0.02 minimum needed.

We will have to see if Steem actually goes up in price. They have to change a lot for it to go up again, right now I don't see it.

Reading off that 2e12 contingent linear rewards curve...

Under HF20 a post receiving $1 in upvotes would give the author $0.75.

Under HF21:

  • The reward pool will be 10% lower to fund the SPS.
  • The CLRC will reduce the payout by a further 40% compared to linear.
  • The payout to the author will then be 50% (rather than 75%).
    I make this: $1 * 90% * (1 - 40%) * 50% = 0.27 under HF21

So broadly: $0.75 under HF20 vs $0.27 under HF21, a reduction of about two-thirds for smaller payouts.

Have I understood that correctly?

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Math checks out. Nothing like making use of bid-bots to get above $6.40 completely mandatory for every post.

But don't forget future traf will spread around thousands of tiny whale-votes instead of upvoting himself 10x daily... that has to count for something, right?

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I think that there will be plenty of innovation to get around the CLRC issues for smaller payouts and comments. These will mostly rely on aggregation techniques, or as you suggest, various forms of vote-selling.

It's a pain though. The CLRC will just bring additional complexity in return for (as far as I'm concerned) no obvious tangible benefit. The "divisible account" issue could be solved through data analysis and downvotes instead.

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Downvotes are still unincentivized and rely on altruism and volunteer work for effort. It is important not to allow that to be attacked by ramping up the necessary effort. Keeping rewards concentrated even if it happens via aggregation techniques as you suggest is necessary to manage the workload required for downvotes. If those aggregation techniques are used in an exploitative manner, they can much more easily be countered with downvotes than 100k or 500k comments scattered all over the place.

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upvoted due to troll downvote, not that i necessarily agree with your comment, just wanted that out there.

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Yep, and a comment receiving $0.08 because some 4000 SP minnow upvotes it at 100%, that now gets you $0.06 will get you $0.00 after HF21 because we still have dust level cut off at 0.02. Great way to kill social interaction on the platform.

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The CLRC introduces a huge market inefficiency. If the 4000SP is delegated to a large account that can aggregate it with other SP then the 4000SP retains close to its $0.08 vote value, e.g. through circular voting / vote selling etc.

A user with 4000SP will be much better off selling those $0.08 upvotes and using the liquid proceeds for social interaction and engagement. I expect innovations to happen pretty quickly under HF21 to facilitate this approach. But it's untidy and introduces another layer of complexity that Steem really does not need.

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I really wonder, with that shitty non-scaling convergent linear reward curve in place, whatt continued justification can there be to maintain the dust level treshold on 0.02 ? Move the bugger to 0.001, or at least move it to 0.006 so the same level of influence needed today to rise above dust level stays intact when HF21 hits. HF21 will screw over smaller accounts and hinder platform growth badly enough without the dust level threshold.

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The dust threshold has more to do with added processing costs at the blockchain level than anything else. Every payout is a significantly expensive operation in terms of resources so there is a reasonable cutoff below which the costs are deemed to high to justify.

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and using the liquid proceeds for social interaction and engagement

That's okay. People sending tips or subscribing for premium benefits or boosting each others content or whatever (as well as earning specialized Steem Engine or SMTs tokens via specific projects and communities) does not have the exploitability and other challenges of a common pool. It probably scales better in many ways.

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So broadly: $0.75 under HF20 vs $0.27 under HF21

It's disaster.

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It's certainly a very significant change for lower earning authors and smaller SP holders. Both groups are likely to reconsider how they interact on the platform.

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With RC limited for newbies, the reward curve too is getting a lot harder. Tsk

Posted using Partiko iOS

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I remember when I started and was only earning a few cents per post or comment. It takes time to get anything moving here. I'm really unconvinced that hitting new users so hard makes sense.

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Indeed it takes time sir @miniature-tiger.

Posted using Partiko iOS

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The RC situation will likely improve somewhat once this is implemented because farming via small comment rewards (some of which already does happen now) will likely stop. I don't know if it will make a huge difference but it will make some difference.

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It just feels like this is going to be an utter disaster.

Posted using Partiko Android

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The SPS is an important change (although hopefully it could still be funded differently). And from the EIP the downvotes is a worthwhile experiment. There are potential toxicity issues but it's the one change that is likely to significantly move the dial on behaviour. It should be possible to clean up trending at the very least.

50/50 could increase manual curation but there are other avenues that will still offer greater economic incentive so the behavioural impact there is hard to call. It would be interesting to see which orcas / whales are committing to pulling delegations and moving to manual curation to get a feel for the potential upside.

The CLRC seems to add very little benefit even when considered as part of an overall package. It also adds a large market inefficiency which will encourage users to work around the system, to the benefit of middlemen. And when combined with the other changes the impact on new accounts / small earners will be huge. That's the part I'd like to see pulled from the HF.

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How would it work if you get larger votes?
Losing 2/3 of my rewards looks scary. It most certanly makes creating content i do less worth it.

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As mentioned many times before, the key thing of EIP is in

encouraging more of the behavior that we want, and discouraging the behavior we don't want

It's change of economic model that, simplifying it to something like "this post will get x instead of y" basing on a shift in rewards is wrong, because it doesn't assume shift in behavior (which should change because of shift of incentives).

Currently, user without SP could take advantage of bit bots, go to trending, gain reputation all that while having negative cost (i.e. earning on that), because selling SP to bit bots is just the easiest way to earn. With 50/50 it will no longer be that simple, because you could earn with your own SP by voting for good content as much as self voting or selling SP to bit bots.

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I expect you gtg to start liking music and upvoting me if i lose 50% of my upvotes because of EIP. haha
I just know this seems like i have to look forward to reduced rewards and if that is the case i will turn into Durins Bane and not lose this time around. :D
I will smote your ruins upon the mountainside. Or something like that. haha

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It's change of economic model that, simplifying it to something like "this post will get x instead of y" basing on a shift in rewards is wrong, because it doesn't assume shift in behavior (which should change because of shift of incentives).

True. However for most users the chances of a large account coming along and upvoting their post will remain small, even if the shift in incentives does change behaviour. As such it's useful to understand how their post payout would change, as a "pre-behavioural" starting point.

Currently, user without SP could take advantage of bit bots, go to trending, gain reputation all that while having negative cost (i.e. earning on that), because selling SP to bit bots is just the easiest way to earn. With 50/50 it will no longer be that simple, because you could earn with your own SP by voting for good content as much as self voting or selling SP to bit bots.

I think that downvotes will be the change that stops the majority of the bid-bot issues. This is worth the experiment.

Large accounts currently earn around 21% of vote value in curation under 25/75, so this will probable double to around 42% of vote value under 50/50. It's still a long way off the close-to-100% of vote value that could be earned by circular voting or higher rewards from vote selling etc. It's a step in the right direction but it will be interesting to see how it actually changes behaviour. Economically, the incentives still don't align towards manual voting.

The CLRC seems to add little value, but again hammers small earning accounts / new accounts as well as comment engagement. The combination impact of the HF21 changes on such small earners is very large. This could be mitigated to some extent by removing the CLRC change from HF21.

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However for most users the chances of a large account coming along and upvoting their post will remain small, even if the shift in incentives does change behaviour

There is more to it than that. An enormous portion of the reward pool is being milked out by self-voting and vote selling. Even a partial counter of that will increase the value paid out in STEEM per vshare. That also offsets the lower vshares per rshares at the low level of the curve resulting in higher rate of STEEM payout for those fewer vshares at the low end, even if no large stakeholder comes along and votes.

There are too many moving parts to do a simple calculation of payout for a particular vote assuming all else is equal and expect that to be remotely valid. It isn't.

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It's true that significant use of downvotes on bad actors would cause an upscaling of rewards on all other content. It's something I should have added into my estimates. However the impact of the SPS / 50/50 and CLRC all act in the opposite direction and those impacts will dominate heavily for small earning posts.

There are too many moving parts to do a simple calculation of payout for a particular vote assuming all else is equal and expect that to be remotely valid. It isn't.

Here I would respectfully disagree. Most of the proposed changes have clear and measurable impacts and getting an initial assessment prior to behavioural changes is useful and a pretty solid starting point. People can then judge how they think behaviour will change those figures.

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We can respectfully agree to disagree. A large portion of (in fact nearly the entirety of) the intent of this is to significantly change behavior. So I don't think that an assessment prior to behavioral changes is a solid starting point in the sense of being a good estimate of the outcomes. It literally can be a 'starting point' in the sense that one can start there and then make large adjustments to get from there to a good estimate, which is what I am pointing out.

It is also quite possible IMO that EIP is a complete failure in the sense that there aren't major behavioral changes, but that's somewhat of a different claim to make.

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You keep on joining the others in supporting downvotes, as if the downvoters were enrolled from the most altruistic and genuine Steemit posters.

In truth?

Most of them downvote where they can, without caring who they damage or why. I've seen many posters who have their own YT or blog page outside of Steemit, who provide their articles here so as to widen their coverage...but then the 'nasties' come after them, downvoting them to invisibility...and even their comments show how vicious and evil-minded they are - just check those on this comment page and you'll see what I mean.

Steemit is handing over power to the most evil of those here....and that will bring about success for us?

How sad that even those with good intentions keep themselves blinkered.

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Of the three changes in the EIP the free downvotes allocation is by far the most powerful and the only one that really has the potential to move the dial on behaviour significantly.

I would agree that there is the potential for issues, in particular an increase in toxicity and account targeting, as well as problems with cheap purchased downvotes, and I would have liked to have seen a lot more work on how such issues could be worked around.

But something does need to change. The economy of the content side of Steem is broken. Downvotes are worth the experiment in my view.

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"because selling SP to bit bots is just the easiest way to earn. With 50/50 it will no longer be that simple", You are wrong, making quality content is best way to earn. This is simply communism taken to the next level, take from the real content creators. This will only piss off the true content creators, you can't build a functional Blockchain on sand, where no investments are in content creators and all the power is in random stake holders

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In practice there will be more downvotes as there will be a downvoting pool which means less money to bad actors and more money for legit ones. Also bidbots will be less profitable. And the 50/50 curation split means it's now much more worth to curate content than before. So people should move away from bidbots and get back to normal curations.

Ultimately if everything goes well the space should improve a lot and your earnings with it. Would you rather earn 10 steem worth 0.40 cents or 4 steem worth 2$ ?

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In the end the value of the coin in terms of market cap will have to be backed up by the value of the content platform, and quite frankly, without somehow onboarding top content creators who now reside on ad revenue sharing platforms, that value isn't going to be all that high. In fact the EIP in its current form is more likely to work against onboarding than for it.

New accounts are going to get screwed over badly by the EIP, what means you will need to be out of your mind even if earning just $20 or $30 a month on ad revenue sharing platforms to move to STEEM after HF21. That's not good, and on the long term that is more likely to push STEEM doen to 0.04 than to keep it at 0.40 or help it grow to 4.00.

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While I agree with you on the earning sides, I don't think it will push people away as we'll see a much more sane environment where new users can actually thrive and not be like "most of the sp is in bidbot so I'm not earning anything"

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But most of the EIP in fact favours growth of the bid bot economy. Just run a little simulation with a few weeks of old data. The narrative and the actual incentives created by the EIP do t actually match. That is, not unless there is a major shift in how the community considers flagging bid bot users indiscriminately.

Have a look at this poll and it's results to get a grasp of the general reluctance towards using flags (that way).

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Just run a little simulation with a few weeks of old data

That method is completely invalid since the entire purpose is to change behavior.

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That is exactly why simulation is essential. It shows who ends up getting incentives to change behaviour, and what alternatives of behavior are available.

I really hope HF20 has shown and thought us the dangers of ommitting propper "real data" simulations on a hard fork.

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But will Steem increase in price because of this?
Steem is 70 in market cap and not many people care about it or know about it.
If nothing changes creators just lose rewards. That is what i fear. :(
I know i could stand on top my head and play violin upside down hanging by my legs from ceiling and i wouldnt get more votes. (haha that is some circus act)

Why think anyone outside steem will notice what we changed and decide to invest?

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The reduction from the SPS (10%) and the 50/50 (33%) combine to 40% when taken together. This will be the base reduction applying to all posts before taking the CLRC into account.

For the CLRC, if your post earns more than a certain amount (16 Steem, i.e. $6.40 - according to the figure in the original post, although I'm still to run the figures on this) then you will be hitting linear and 40% will be the reduction. If you earn more than this break-even level then you will get a slight raise (i.e. less than a 40% reduction), as the reductions made by the CLRC on small value posts will end up being spread over larger value posts.

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Better Blockchains that are 100% focused on content creators will be out in 1-2 years ;)

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SEC cracking down hard, good luck with liquidity when binance shuts down in sept for USA .

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The reward pool will be 10% lower to fund the SPS.

If this is what is actually being proposed, then I would reject this hard fork. There is other existing inflation from which funding can be reallocated for the SPS.

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But reward pool is the most natural source of it. Currently to fund a project you need to make posts that gets you rewards, that's pretty gives much same effect but it takes from a source that's abused the most.

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I would much rather redirect some of the inflation from "SP interest" and then eliminate the rest of it rather than pull it all from content rewards. There's more than enough tokens there to cover SPS funding and "SP interest" is an absolute joke, both conceptually and economically.

We can reduce overall inflation (positive for perception and price action), fund the SPS (positive for development), and not adversely affect the content rewards pool (positive/neutral for creators and curators) all at the same time. Why would we not do that?

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This was heavily discussed, investors have much more at stake than authors, so it makes sense not to touch that.

Edit : I realize that I should write a much longer comment explaining my views but I don't have the time right now.

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The “interest” is stupid and makes zero economic sense when paid with inflation. If “investors” and the witnesses deciding on these protocol changes can’t figure that out, then they’re idiots.

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As discussed elsewhere it has the effect of allocating the other (real) inflation between powered-up and non-powered-up investors such that powered up investors pay a bit less and non-powered up investors pay a bit more.

It has an economic effect. We could argue whether that effect is desirable or not. I would probably be in favor of simply eliminating it, but not in shifting it out to 'real' inflation, which would have the effect of increasing the latter.

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I would be OK with eliminating it entirely and scrapping the SPS altogether. But I’m pretty sure we’re getting the SPS. Since that’s going to happen, I would like to see 2/3 of the 15% “interest” eliminated and the remaining 1/3 (5% of the total inflation) allocated to the SPS rather than coming from content rewards.

It’s just a preference and I understand the arguments for directing inflation to stakeholders, but it’s still a really dumb idea that should have never been coded...just as the 100% annual inflation should have never been a thing. It would likely be more advantageous for stakeholders to have a lower annual inflation rate than to gain some small amount of “interest” that puts downward pressure on prices, especially when demand seems to be quite low.

Sending the inflation to development projects or to other stakeholders really doesn’t affect the perception of the chain/token value much. And seeing that many of our larger stakeholders are powering down (and usually selling) anyway - including STINC, still our largest stakeholder that’s receiving the largest portion of the inflation - that inflation is heading to the open markets anyway.

So yeah - get rid of most of it and redirect what’s left. Or just get rid of it altogether and forget about the SPS. Either option works for me. I don’t think we need less content rewards. Less author rewards, sure. But not less for curation too, since that’s pretty much the only reason to hold STEEM as SP. I’d rather not see less incentive to buy and power up.

Additional SP utility other than curation rewards would be nice to see as well.

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Redirecting from SP interest ends up increasing overall effective inflation. In reality, the only effect of SP interest is to allocate the other inflation costs between powered-up and non-powered-up investors.

It's kind of unfortunate that SP interest aka vesting rewards constantly ends up being described as a portion of inflation (including in the steemitblog post pie charts) because its function is really quite differently from the others.

I also agree with gtg that the content pool and SPS pool are natural equivalents. They both involve making a tranasction to the blockchain asking stakeholders to vote to pay you. The only difference is the particulars of the voting and payout rules. You could actually look at SPS proposals as being a type of post.

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If you have understood correctly then we are fucked up mate. Those small payouts you are talking about are what...less than 1$? Everything less than 3$...maybe less than 5$?

Who will be affected most?

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Who will be affected most?

Mediocre, and shitpost producers who post 10x / day, feeding themselves mostly from bid bots.

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Mediocre, and shitpost producers who post 10x / day, feeding themselves mostly from bid bots.

I truly hope you are right. I'm looking at all the Minnow and Red Fish crew. Are they going to still want to post anymore? This new curve does not seem to be good for them at all.

Is everyone now going to focus on curation only, and the post level is going to reduce by 80%? it's going to be different, that's for sure.

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Is everyone now going to focus on curation only,

In order to focus on curation there’s got to be content...and most of the content is being produced by the small accounts. I am not so sure that they will be willing to post so often anymore...This is a massacre for small accounts.

If the real purpose of this HF is to fight self voters and bid bot abusers only then how about the implementation of a mechanism that allows maximum 1 bid bot per post? And how about a couple of free downvotes for everyone so that we can fight those abusers?

Am I the only one around who thinks that these curves are not good at all ?

64% and 54% cut respectively is a major reduction. Massive...

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I am not so sure that they will be willing to post so often anymore...This is a massacre for small accounts.

Yes, I get this feeling too. Is it going to be approved? From what I gather it is by vote but I feel this change it a little radical...

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The bid bot economy is only going to grow larger as a result of these measures. Passive stake holders will switch from self voting to delegating to bid bots and other false curation services. Because of the 50/50 split, the price for bid bot usage will drop without a drop in ROI for bid bot owners, so the money being pumped around will end up supporting more bid bot SP. Small accounts will need to resort to bid bots even more just for reaching dust level, but most will want to aim for that magic 16.000 if they want some growth, so trending will end up a bigger mess than it is now.

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I think that the reduction is approximately:

  • 64% reduction in author payout at $1 post.
  • 54% reduction in author payout at $5 post.

Although clearly these are a combination of the three reduction impacts (SPS, CLRC, 50/50) not just the CLRC.

In my view it shifts the balance of the content side of Steem away from being a social network and towards being a blogging platform. Users who currently gain lots of small payouts, i.e. the engagers and social networkers, will be most affected, as well as new users trying to get a foothold on the platform.

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So instead of doing the exact opposite, we are trying what exactly?To hammer the payouts of those who earn pennies and discourage all those which we have desperately been waiting to join us for so long?...maybe we are doing things wrong....? Just saying.

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fun days are ahead.
could we please just test it fast and get it over it, so i don't read about it any more and just be happy with my 10-20 cents.

Unfortunately, the comment section under this post is - again - another 'great' example for the damaging effect of flag wars on STEEM. What a devastating impression (potential) newbies (and investors) will have when reading all that?

I think there should be an elected committee with lots of delegated SP (for example from Steemit, Inc.) to be able to discuss, decide about and counter abusive flags if necessary. Only then - in addition - a downvote pool made sense in my opinion.

I hope these changes are for the best, we really need to accelerate progress immediately or else we will lose our first movers advantage

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Multiple competing social media platforms now provide cryptocurrency 'tips'. We are already being outcompeted due to the failure of extant and former devs to implement rational code that encourages capital gains, and have instead encouraged extractive profiteering.

We have lost the first mover advantage, and are facing existential loss of users. Absent preparations to reverse these changes should they prove to worsen the price, market cap, and user retention of Steem, real risk of the platform being abandoned for more functional platforms is being undertaken.

I have been a strong booster of Steem since my advent here. Unless code that implements sound investment principles becomes operational, this experiment will have failed. Massive powerdowns are ongoing, and I believe that this is being done to extract the remnant of value left in Steem that EIP will make happen faster, so that those powering down in advance will be able to sell before the price crashes.

Events will prove me wrong, or prove me right. I didn't come here for tokens, but for censorship resistance. This comment will be flagged by a censor, and is likely to be self-voted to profit the censor thereby, and further is unlikely to be nominally downvoted to prevent that from being profitable because of the direct written threat of retaliation by the censor.

Do consider these real facts when they are effected as I predict. Consider why I am able to predict these things, and that my previous and repeated comments have included functional mechanisms to prevent the end of Steem by implementing sound investing principles. Investing isn't rocket science, and common sense is all that is necessary to grasp how capital gains work.

Thanks!

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Lol, we said that two years ago when they forced this debacle on us.
The whales that have recouped their investments lose nothing by steem going to pennies.
Stinc has their millions and are having a hard time finding a fuck to give.
We wouldn't be having this problem any other way.
Once the hunger was gone, it was all over but the getting fat.

My only question at this point is: what are the specific, measurable, and timely goalposts by which we can judge whether the EIP has performed the black magic to make everything shiny that its proponents claim, and are we prepared to commit to giving up on it when it inevitably fails them?

It's pretty clear by now that this is going to have to be tried and fail dramatically before anyone thinks about doing anything actually productive, and I just hope someone's thinking about how to identify when that failure has happened.

#sbi-skip

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Yes exactly. We need some defined goals so we know when this has failed. Downvote wars that drive users away? More people powering down than they are currently? Less new users coming aboard? What are the metrics? We likely can't just use the price of steem because it will probably ride a random crypto wide pump at some point.

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If they had run some simple simulations with a few weeks of data, this would be crystal clear for everyone. The EIP is going to create incentives that favor the bid bot economy.

  • There should be a factor of about 3x in total influence needed to get a post or comment past dust level, incentifying more medium sized accounts to use bid bots.
  • The ROI for bid bot users will decrease while the ROI for bid bot owners will increase, incentifying a drop in price for bid bot usage.
  • The drop in price for bid bot usage will free up money currently being pumped around, creating a demand for new stake delegated to bid bots.
  • The flag pool will make self up voters (who hardly do harm to the content economy) more vulnerable to getting flagged, creating new insentive to delegate to bid bots.

I think there are a few simple fixes possible for this part:

  • Drop dust level from 0.02 to 0.005
  • Curator/Author buckets as described here

There are other issues with the EIP, that make it very likely to backfire even worse. The other type of backfire isn't that easy to simulate or measure after the fact though as it involves new accounts, platform growth and onboarding.

It is really interesting how Steemit believes it can grow its economy while not adressing inflation in any way and while not adressing the fact that STEEM is losing the battle for top content creators. For a real EIP we desperately need usefull features that burn STEEM and we need STEEM to truly compete with add revenue platforms and pull in those top content creators and their follower base from other platforms.

The EIP is going to backfire in more ways than one. The bid bot economy growth clearly being the most predictable and visible. Lets hope that lacking proper simulations (they wouldn't have gone through with the EIP in its current form if they had actually simulated the effects on the bid bot economy), they at least set evaluation parameters for success and failure for the EIP, so we can look forward to a HF22 in a few months that either reverts or fixes the current EIP implementation.

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You were pointed out with utmost brevity by @smooth previously that Garbage in = Garbage out.

So asking for simulations based on trash, what do you expect to discover, or you really think Anything meaningful can be ascertained from trash curation, trash Posting and trash engagement?

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what are the specific, measurable, and timely goalposts by which we can judge whether the EIP has performed the black magic to make everything shiny that its proponents claim,

Uhm, there is no one here who also understands Spanish?

Pft dudes! just click on this green text 'spanish' link above to find out a pretty insightful video inside of what was meant as a jolly Carnival post three months ago. And you all will have a pretty close idea about how EIP will perform.

PS. Don't worry!! if you don't speak spanish, there are also subtitles in english & portuguese to get the sobering spanks quite right. };)

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what are the specific, measurable, and timely goalposts by which we can judge whether the EIP has performed

@trafalgar is probably the best one to answer this or perhaps he can point to some existing posts to answer it.

This is unacceptable! No true information, vapid details, arbitrary math, allured promises of things that always seem to be "3 months away" or "the next big thing." The fact that this has been put up for proposal is disgusting and everyone involved should be utterly ashamed of themselves.

I hereby demand that the top top 20 witnesses:

@yabapmatt
@curie
@blocktrades
@gtg
@roelandp
@someguy123
@good-karma
@themarkymark
@therealwolf
@aggroed
@cervantes
@thecryptodrive
@ocd-witness
@timcliff
@anyx
@ausbitbank
@smooth.witness
@followbtcnews
@lukestokes.mhth
@clayop

Reject this HF proposal. It is unacceptable to the Steem network to have such disastrous idea for a HF be implemented without taking into consideration how it will affect those non-whale Steem users. I know 2 of you were on the fence, only two more can stop this nightmare from happening.

Reject this proposal, and instead focus on building a better Steem network incrementally, where each part is fully considered and accounted for, before it is implemented. Reject this proposal so that better ideas and systems can be implemented that will actually help Steem grow.

Reject The HF21 Proposal!

#RejectHF21 #MakeSteemGreatAgain

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Hi @southernwolf, personally I'm not in favour of as big a change as 50/50 reduction in author/curator rewards, nor am I a fan of deducting as much from the content rewards for the SPS funding, I feel more should be taken from the SP interest which no external investors even know about and 1% from witnesses as a show of solidarity. The other changes are great, the free downvote pool is awesome, but should have been delegateable. The SPS worker proposal system will be good also in itself to lure developers to Steem in search of funding for their idea.

I invite you to have your say in a structured forum discussion on https://neosteem.com/topic-list?category=hf21 it will be easily referenced there for all users, mitigating the need to comb through separate posts to find discussions.

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While I'm pro 50/50, I also prefer the downvote pool to be separately delegatable, but that's more about balancing dev costs.

I was strongly in favor of most of the SPS funding to come from vesting rather than author/curation. It's strange to me that people are pushing for it to come from author/curation this hard when vesting interest does virtually nothing.

10% for SPS seems a little high for something whose rules are quite unproven and may be quite exploitable in practice (not looked into it personally). I would have started it at 5-7% and cranked it up the next HF if the rules were solid.

Could you at least bring up SPS funding at least partially coming from vesting interest rather than author curation again with the witnesses? I know you and tim are open to this. Seems weird to attempt to fix the rewards economy while simultaneously nerfing it further when we can get it funded elsewhere with hopefully little dissent. Who's truly fighting tooth and nail for the vesting interest?

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The vesting interest doesn't do nothing. It allocates more of the costs of 'real' inflation (i.e. the other categories) to non-powered-up investors. We could agree or disagree on whether that it is a good thing but that is its actual effect not 'nothing'.

I'm not in favor using vesting interest because I don't agree that it is even in the same category as the rest of inflation. It isn't real inflation at all, it is a cost allocation between investor classes. Shifting it to non-investors is a real inflation increase.

Content rewards are a cost that investors (unequally by class; see above) pay in order to attempt to add value to Steem by making payouts to users with votes (some of which in fact represents the same sort of projects making posts to appeal for funding/votes that SPS itself addresses). It is entirely reasonable for investors to say that they want to start making some portion of those payouts to users via slightly different voting and payout rules (optimized specifically toward targeted and/or ongoing work and projects than the existing pool, even though the existing pool is often used for that too). That is what SPS is actually doing.

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At least in the comment to which you were replying, I was careful enough to say virtually nothing, rather than actually nothing.

I stated in the channel given the volatility of the underlying asset, an extra 2% is unlikely to have any bearing on actual investor behavior (both trading and staking). This seems to be largely true at least from anecdotal testimonials. That is to say all who have been approached by this question have replied that they've never personally had any decision to power up or down be tilted by this added incentive, nor any decision to buy or sell Steem, which seems fairly consistent with intuition.

I understand your perspective to be as follows: irrespective of it having possibly negligible effects on actual investor behavior, a (roughly) 2% mitigation against an 8% inflation is very non trivial for stakeholders and therefore valuable.

However, if we lock down investor behavior, then however much stakers are favored over non stakers will only affect their individual interests within the system and insofar as it's insufficient to affect market behavior in any way. It's the one variable we can't lock down if we wish to introduce actual value from a use of inflation to the system as a whole.

Whatever we're seeking to achieve with the SPS or EIP (however unsuccessfully in the past), can be broadly summarized as starting a chain reaction that will hopefully lead to more Steem buying pressure. That's the one thing that matters, but it's the one thing that seems to be a huge stretch for vesting interests to lay claim on. It isn't a matter of failed execution, it's just conceptually a very redundant use of inflation.

In terms of additional incentives to vest, the 50% curation will also act as a counter weight against too much liquid Steem vs SP. While this is only half the amount of the inflation, considering that most of Inc's stake is idle, then in practice the difference between the two options is fairly similar for most stakeholders. Of course if the EIP goes well then author/curation also serves to further the content discovery and rewards goals of the platform.

I really implore you to reconsider this in light of my arguments once more please.


Irrespective of where the inflation ultimately comes from, I'm assuming you and @blocktrades feel that economic rule set of the SPS is sound enough to kick it off with 10% inflation? I haven't looked at it, it's not really my place as I'm intruding enough into your HF already, and I'll trust your combined judgement on this. Not holding you to an unfairly high standard of course, econ and behavior being difficult to predict, but you've no doubt played it out countless times in your mind and things look good at expected equilibrium that you wouldn't want to start with a lower value?

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I really implore you to reconsider this in light of my arguments once more please.

I'm unlikely to reconsider the propriety of shifting the vesting reward which as I've stated numerous places is different in kind to to the other forms of inflation, and really should not be considered as part of a common pool at all. 'Shifting' it is really a misnomer. I'm not opposed (and possibly in favor) of simply eliminating it.

I'm assuming you and @blocktrades feel that economic rule set of the SPS is sound enough to kick it off with 10% inflation?

Mostly based on what @blocktrades has said, it appears to be equivalent to the Bitshares system which has been running for years and he appears to be quite confident that it is workable.

I have no experience with Bitshares nor any other equivalent system. Therefore I can't say anything out of personal experience, but it seems okay to me. Bear in mind that '10% of inflation' is really something like 0.85% of market cap per year. I very seriously doubt we can break anything important before arranging for another fork in the event that it did, despite the above factors, have serious problems (a few months I guess).

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It's a preference. I don't find it to be utterly unbearable other than it irks me to have the 15% inflation going into something that's almost guaranteed to have no affect on shifting investor, and therefore market behavior not be a prime candidate when searching for funding sources.

Yes, SPS failure isn't the end of the world, worst case scenario we get a shit fest there that's only 13% the size of the current one, whether it comes from a share of the current one or not.

I see, with a successful bts example as a reference point, then it should hopefully function well. Whether they use inflation or not, it's ultimately about the efficient allocation of public goods so their model should prove valuable.

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As I have said several times now (though not only in this thread), I don't consider it to be real inflation and therefore I don't consider it to be a candidate funding source at all.

If you pay 100%/y inflation back to investors it means everyone ends up with twice as many tokens and the price is probably half, so apart from psychological factors in terms of price charts, it has almost no effect in underlying economics. That is not real inflation, and it doesn't constitute a 'funding source' where you could then take that same 100% inflation, start paying it to non-investors and not have that be an enormous increase to the real inflation in terms of underlying economics.

The actual situation with the vesting reward is the same very thing, although the numbers are obviously smaller (disregarding the effect on cost shifting between STEEM and SP, which is of debatable value).

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Vesting interest is the only reason to power up is it not?

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if we're just talking about staking returns rather than less tangible reasons (influence etc) then 50% curation should provide a significant reason to power up and act as a counter weight against too much liquid steem

Vesting interest has an insignificant impact on one's propensity to power up.

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No, powering up also lets you vote on content and earn curation rewards as well as vote for witnesses.

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But you have to translate how powering up produces greater $ than the alternative. You gotta factor in opportunity cost. It is for that reason why we must always be increasing the ease and attractiveness of powering up long term.

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At this point the opportunity cost of it taking 13 weeks (6.5 weeks average) to power down isn't very high.

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@trafalgar, I also agree vesting interest does nothing and only a few stakeholders know about it, it benefits Steemit Inc mainly because of their huge stake, they earn close on 1 Mil SP per annum. I also feel the SPS is unproven and could be gamed so 5-7% is perfectly sane.

I will try push the issue a bit in the devs slack, can I ask you to assist me also and perhaps contribute to discussions in the dedicated forum we have created to try get some structured non-fragmented discussion going. Feel free to create a topic, from next week sometime you will even earn beneficiary rewards from everyone who replies to your topic, so that may interest you. Here is the link https://neosteem.com/topic-list?category=hf21

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Thank you.

Please clarify that I'm not at all insistent on the part about SPS being lowered to 5-7% from 10%. I just think it's prudent to consider, but not a dealbreaker if we start at 10%. I'm broadly in favor of an inflation funded SPS.

I just strongly believe it should come from vesting rather than nerfing author/curation. If the EIP is fairly successful, we should be very reluctant to take it from businesses, genuine authors, genuine engagement and staking curators other than to the extent it's required to promote honest voting practices which is what EIP is designed to do.

On the other hand I see very little reason that anyone would defend vesting interest that strongly. An extra 1-2% for stakers on an underlying asset that's as volatile as Steem has a negligible impact on prospective investors/stakers. Yet it's quite expensive for the system as a whole. Taking the 10% from vesting interest should really be reconsidered.

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Cool I'll just paste this reply in the private channel so I don't get the gist wrong. You can also paste from your account in the forum link I sent you above.

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I would fight for it, but I'm not allowed in their secret Slack and nobody outside of a couple of top witnesses seem to care anyway. I wrote about this two weeks ago. Don't recall seeing any top witnesses commenting on it...certainly not in any meaningful way.

https://steemit.com/steem/@ats-david/thoughts-on-the-steem-proposal-system-sps

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I did fight for it. But the conversation sorta ended very abruptly for some reason. I think it was because ned suddenly said he'd support it coming from author/curation because some of the community were trying to hold him to the $2m or $6m or whatever he allegedly promised as funding for the SPS.

Nevertheless, now that people have a better understanding of the EIP and believe it could go a long way to fixing overall voting behavior here, they may be more reluctant to take it from author/curator. Either way the 1-2% of extra staking returns from vesting interest on an underlying asset as volatile as Steem does next to nothing and is a complete waste of inflation.

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Funny I remember this differently. You sure would make a good politician though 🙂

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You seem to be implying I'm lying

You absolutely certain you don't have me confused with someone else?

May 14th, one of the first things I said after returning to slack chat:

I'm happy to test a workers proposal scheme. But I don't believe the funding should come from authors or witnesses if we have an other wise working system as that's where our central value proposition is. It's easy to want it take it from there now because this part is completely failing, but in a working system you want to leave as much of it there as possible. There's a much better alternative: (edited)
Currently we spend around 15% of the ~8% inflation or so on paying staking rewards directly. This amounts to around 1.2%p.a. Factoring in the that a lot of Steem is liquid and don't enjoy this, let's say SP stakers get 2-3% a year.

Given the volatility of the underlining asset (that has gone from 4c to $8 back down to 20c in 2 years) we can see movements of 100x+ p.a. That is 10,000%+. Even if those numbers are outliers, movements of 1000% are probably conservative (edited)
No rational investor will have their investment decision be materially affected by an extra 2-3% if the underlying asset is consistently varying at a thousand times that amount. It is less than a trivial incentive for an investor. Yet it is not a trivial cost to the system. 15% of inflation is expensive for us and it's doing nothing.

Search 'vesting interest' in general, slack chat, May 21st, I count several messages by me pushing strongly against the idea of SPS coming from author curation and suggesting it should come from vesting instead.

Who would be staunchly defending vesting interest? If we took half of that which is 7.5% of inflation and see how SPS runs with it along with the 200k Steem and post donations I think that's a good start. Witness pay and author curation have their staunch defenders for now, but I'd like to hear from those who firmly believe that the 1.2% inflation to pay 2% SP interest is a strong enough motivator to justify it's cost

Among many other messages. And it's very evident from the context of the conversation they weren't recently edited.

A few more in hp_eip channel on June 3rd showing up in search

However, I do strongly suggest reconsidering where the SPS funds come from, and recommend that most of it come from vesting interest rather than author/curation

There's one from me as far back as april 2017 questioning the soundness of vesting interest. As well as a post by me written around that time criticizing

is that correct? the effect of this is only a ~1.5% per annum interest on total steem power for all vested steem, is that really worth the 15% allocation of total distribution? Or am I missing something?

I don't think I've ever advocated SPS funding to come from author curation. At most I've reluctantly accepted it as a compromise as I'm getting most of the numbers I wanted for the EIP.

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Yes I am aware of what you have said in slack, but let’s not pretend you are fighting for anything but “the numbers you wanted for the EIP.”

The truth of the matter is that any discussion were halted about SPS funding due to the abrupt attempt to shove the EIP into this hardfork.. as soon as Steemit Inc said they were open to discussion on the changes (while prefacing that they would NOT be working on them now or including them in the HF) the conversation quickly changed.

The change in topic had nothing to do with somehow what Ned said about funding, as yes there were funds promised, and if that changed then the intelligent thing to do would be to discuss where sustainable funding would come from. But the abrupt change in topic came from the push for EIP to be included and was forced into every conversation about the SPS.. so please stop acting like you are fighting for the little guys.

Campaign for “getting everything YOU want in the EIP” and just leave the SPS alone. You have done enough.

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(Heh, I truly didn’t expect any of the witnesses to respond to me! :) )

This is a fantastic resource, thanks for sharing! And you are absolutely correct! I fully agree with your ideas you said here!

Posted using Partiko iOS

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Hmm... I'm not sure about that! You could just be some Nvidia RTX's connected together! ;)

(Also, you have well and truly earned my witness vote!)

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I visited the link you posted above and I noticed it is also similar to #tokenbb. Does this means that we can't access the normal tokenbb website anymore and start using the neosteem ?

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